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THE INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION OF PARLIAMENT 
 
David Judge and Cristina Leston-Bandeira 
 
Abstract 
Recent theoretical reconceptualisations of political representation and contemporary empirical 
analyses of parliamentary representation have largely neglected the representation of parliaments 
as institutions. As a consequence, relatively little attention has been focused upon what is being 
communicated to citizens about parliaments and upon the nature of the parliamentary institutions 
that citizens are expected to engage with. This is the neglected institutional dimension of 
parliamentary representation. Using interview data from 39 key actors in the Scottish, Westminster 
and European Parliaments, we analyse who act as ‘claim-makers’ on behalf of parliaments, the 
nature of these claims in different political contexts, and the ‘symbolic intent’ and claims associated 
with the architectural design of parliamentary buildings. We identify a basic paradox of institutional 
representation in that those who ‘speak for’ (most loudly and most persistently) and ‘act for’ 
parliaments as institutions are not primarily elected representatives but rather non-elected officials. 
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Introduction 
 
Established democracies in recent decades have been confronted with manifest political 
disengagement, decreased levels of citizen trust in parliamentary representatives, and 
increased public dissatisfaction with the competence of parliaments (Dalton 2004; Norris 
2011). In these circumstances, parliamentary institutions increasingly have had to ‘become 
promoters of the values and operation of parliamentary democracy, bringing about a cultural 
and attitudinal shift within each institution’ (Hansard Society 2010:68; IPU 2012:41). In 
analysing this shift the primary academic focus to-date has been upon democratic linkage – 
of how parliaments engage with and inform citizens (see Kelso 2007; Clark and Wilford 2011; 
Walker 2012; Author 2012; 2014; 2016). This pre-occupation has reflected, in turn, a primary 
concern with what we identify in this article as the first dimension of parliamentary 
representation: of how the represented and representatives (as individuals and groups of 
individuals) interact. As a consequence, relatively little attention has been focused upon what 
is being communicated to citizens about parliaments and upon the nature of the parliamentary 
institutions that citizens are expected to engage with. This is the neglected institutional 
dimension of parliamentary representation: the representation of what parliaments ‘are’, what 
claims are made on their behalf and who are the makers of these claims. This second 
dimension is our focus in this article. In this dimension political representation is not confined 
to person-to-person or group-to-group interactions but encompasses a second systemic 
institutional dimension of political representation. 
 
The institutions under examination in this article are parliaments, specifically those nested in 
the multi-layered representative systems of the United Kingdom. We argue that claim-based 
notions of representation and conceptions of symbolic representation, at the heart of recent 
re-conceptualisations of representation, provide valuable conceptual stepping-stones from the 
first person-to-person dimension to the second institutional dimension. In focusing upon this 
second dimension we seek to identify the differing contexts within which institutional 
representative claims are made for parliaments; who act as claim-makers on behalf of 
parliaments; the nature of the claims made; the symbolic prompts offered by parliamentary 
architecture; and the growing significance of institutional representation when basic 
assumptions about the legitimacy of parliamentary institutions come under sustained critical 
questioning.  
 
The choice of the three legislatures in our sample enables an examination of the symbolic and 
institutional claims made by parliaments in distinctly different political, socio-cultural and 
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constitutional contexts. The UK parliament is an historic institution embedded within an 
established demos defined by the boundaries of the UK state, yet confronted by claims of 
democratic deficiencies and assertions of pluri-national identities. The Scottish parliament is 
a relatively newly created institution at sub-state level reflecting a distinctive political national 
identity and afforded a blank slate in its approach to institutional structures and organisation. 
The European Parliament (EP) is an evolving, and expanding, purportedly sui generis, supra-
state representative institution with multiple-demoi and no discernible coherent European 
political identity. 
 
Our analysis is informed by qualitative data drawn from interviews with key parliamentary 
actors in each of the three parliaments. In total 39 interviews were conducted, as part of a 
broader project, with parliamentary officials and parliamentarians (12 from Holyrood, 16 from 
Westminster and 11 from the EP). All interviewees were selected through a purposive sample 
approach, according to the role they performed within the legislature in relation to institutional 
management and the delivery of public engagement services. The interviews were conducted, 
with a condition of anonymity, between November 2010 and January 2013. Other supporting 
data were derived from official parliamentary documents, parliamentary debates, and 
publically available documents relating to architectural design and public engagement 
strategies of each parliament. 
 
The ‘representative turn’, the ‘constructivist turn’ and the neglect of institutional 
representation 
 
A ‘representative turn’ has become increasingly noticeable in the study of democratic politics 
in recent years. Or, more particularly, analysts and theorists of democracy have attempted a 
re-conceptualisation and rethinking of political representation beyond a standard model of 
electoral representation (for overviews see Urbinati and Warren 2008; Näsström 2011). A 
standard model primarily ‘reduces political representation to parliamentary representation’ 
(Disch 2015:489).1 The representative turn, however, has recognised that, in the rapidly 
changing political environment of the 21st century, ‘the boundaries of [representative] 
democracy are seen as less distinct than before … [and] it is no longer self-evident who 
speaks for whom, and by what authority’ (Näsström 2011:501), and so has served to re-focus 
and re-orientate contemporary analysis of political representation. A central tenet of this 
rethinking has thus been a privileging of non-electoral, informal, self-authorised, and non-
statal variants of representation beyond the institutional configurations of elections and 
representative assemblies. In this re-conceptualisation, the macro-deliberative pre-eminence 
of state parliaments in the standard account has been questioned by broader and more radical 
notions of deliberation and democratic innovation in civil society (Smith 2009).  
 
A ‘constructivist turn’ has also targeted the inadequacies of a standard model of political 
representation. A particularly prominent role in the recent re-conceptualisation of 
representation has been played by Michael Saward (2006; 2010) in his articulation of the idea 
of ‘the representative claim’. Indeed, Disch (2015:487) maintains that Saward’s notion of 
representative claim provides the ‘most influential statement of the constructivist position on 
political representation today’.2 In arguing that political representation is a process of claim-
making, Saward has sought to map out new theoretical territory and to blur the distinction 
between electoral and non-electoral representation. For the purposes of this article, however, 
Saward’s conceptual map allows us to move beyond the terrain of non-electoral 
representation and to prospect the terrain of institutional representation.  
 
Saward’s ideas are of specific relevance for exploring the terrain of institutional representation 
in his formulation that a representative does not simply act for the represented but serves to 
construct the latter ‘in the sense of portraying them or framing them in particular, contestable 
ways’ (2010:47). We argue this is especially the case for the representation of political 
institutions. To make this case we need first to understand the concept of claim-making. 
Saward (2010:43) argues that claim-making consists of five interconnecting dimensions: 
maker, subject, object, referent, and audience; a maker, either as an individual or collective 
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actor, constructs or makes claims; a subject is a signifier and stands for an object; a referent 
is the thing being represented; and an audience receives the claims made – and accepts, 
rejects or ignores them. Perhaps the simplest way to understand the concept of referent is as 
something that exists ‘out there’ it is ‘a thing “as it is”’ (Decreus 2013:37). When this ‘thing’ is 
represented, there is an act of interpretation or portrayal, which in itself is constitutive. In this 
manner, as Disch (2015:488-92) notes, the ‘picturing’, ‘aesthetic’, or ‘performative’ aspects of 
representation are central to constructivist theories. This invokes Pitkin’s classic notion of 
representation as standing for, and draws our attention to her conception of symbolic 
representation, wherein ‘[s]ymbols …represent their referent’ (Pitkin 1967:94). Indeed, Pitkin 
was willing to acknowledge the capacity of inanimate objects and abstract ideas to serve as 
representative symbols: ‘It is possible to speak of representing by inanimate objects’ 
(1967:111) but this entails ‘a special kind of activity … the activity of making something 
represent’ (1967:111). This special form of activity ‘seems to rest entirely on people’s belief or 
acceptance’ (1967:110). This then raises the question of how these beliefs or acceptances 
are constructed. An answer has to be found beyond Pitkin’s writings and in the activity of 
construction of meaning. In Mitchell’s words (1962:123, quoted in Lombardo and Meier 
2014:22): ‘Symbolic objects derive their meaning from the actions and beliefs of persons, not 
from the objects themselves’. This statement, in turn, leads us back to Saward’s (2010:36) 
claim that ‘the thing represented is an idea of it, not the thing itself’. Indeed, Saward (2010:90-
1) provides an insight into the significance of the ‘symbolic architecture of our political system’ 
in his acknowledgement that ‘the encompassing domes of parliaments and legislatures’ 
provide powerful symbols of the institutional configuration of representative democracy. 
Nonetheless, while symbolic representation is of importance for understanding the 
representation of parliaments as institutions; exactly how those symbolic cues are interpreted 
and received by audiences of citizens is dependent upon political context, culture and time. 
The importance of the constructivist turn, for our discussion, is in stressing that the cueing 
effect of symbols is not intrinsic but is interpreted. 
 
Although constructivist ideas of claim-making and symbolic representation hold the potential 
to open up the analytical space of institutional representation, this dimension has been 
neglected in the recent representative turn, with little re-conceptualisation of what parliaments 
are and how they ‘re-present’ themselves to the represented. In large part this is because 
parliaments have often been treated as ‘ready-mades’ and ‘taken-for-granted’ institutions of 
representation. They are, as Saward (2010:46) notes, ready-mades in that they are familiar 
institutions that tap into ‘existing terms and understandings’, they are readily identifiable, and 
they ‘resonate’ with citizens. They are taken-for-granted insofar as citizens may demonstrate 
limited knowledge of the specific activities and performance of parliaments, yet they have 
displayed, in Easton’s terms, diffuse support for parliamentary institutions, despite declining 
levels of trust. Such support in liberal democracies is often tacit, even covert (Easton 
1965:161), frequently unthinking, but, nonetheless, profound in the sense that it gives elected 
representative institutions ‘a head start in terms of familiarity and perceived legitimacy’ 
(Saward 2010:65). What also gives parliaments a head start is that, at ‘a strongly abstract 
level’, it is a state’s legislature in liberal democracies that ‘brings the nation together 
symbolically under one roof’ (Saward 2010:90).  
 
Yet, assumptions about the taken-for-granted and ready-made default status of elected 
representative institutions have come increasingly to be challenged by other non-electoral and 
non-traditional modes of representation. In response, established parliaments have been led 
towards more explicit constructions of institutional representational claims and greater 
promotion of the symbolic importance of parliamentary architecture and artefacts as 
representational forms of standing for the ideas of parliamentarism.3 Alternatively, newly 
established parliaments – with no, or few, historical residues of ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of their 
institutional legitimacy and status – have had to be proactive in generating their own 
institutional claims.  
 
In reaching this point we have so far conjoined notions of symbolic representation and 
representative claim-making. For analytical purposes, however, these notions can be 
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disaggregated by identifying two discrete, but often inter-linked, sets of claims associated with 
parliaments as institutions. One is concerned with ‘symbolic intent’ and the claims inhered 
within the architectural design of parliamentary buildings, and the invocation of the symbolism 
of those buildings in claims about their political significance (see Parkinson 2012:95-121). The 
other is concerned with the ‘terms and understandings’ of parliamentarism and the legitimation 
claims made on behalf of parliamentary institutions. At their starkest, these sets of claims 
reflect differing constructions of ‘an institution’. For presentational purposes our discussion is 
structured around two, of many, approaches to answering the question ‘what is an institution?’. 
First, an architectural/spatial approach, in which the physical form of a building signifies an 
institution’s purpose. Second, an institutionalist conception of political institutions as ‘rules of 
the game’ (Rothstein 1996:145; Lowndes and Roberts 2013:46), where such institutions are 
identified as ‘creat[ing] an interpretative order within which political order can be understood’ 
(March and Olsen 1989:45).  
 
This basic distinction is used to structure the following discussion, and to facilitate our 
examination of the nature of claim-making about parliament as an institution, and, more 
importantly, claim-making for the institution and on its behalf. This does not signify that these 
are the only sources of claim-making, as manifestly there are other significant ‘makers’ of 
claims about parliamentary institutions – often providing antithetical interpretations and 
constructions about the symbolic intent and legitimacy of these institutions. Our next step, 
therefore, is to examine the symbolic intent of parliamentary architecture in the UK, Scottish 
and European parliaments; before proceeding to an analysis of the utility of constructivist 
ideas in understanding the emerging practices of institutional representation. 
 
‘Symbolic intent’ and parliamentary architecture 
 
There is nothing new in noting that ‘[n]ational Parliamentary buildings are amongst the most 
prominent symbols of government in any polity’ (Goodsell 1988:287; Rai 2010:285; Therborn 
2014). But there is something relatively new in the ‘spatial turn’ taken by social scientists (see 
Parkinson 2012:6-8), which is of relevance to the representative turn taken by political 
theorists. The intersection of these ‘turns’ – in parliamentary architecture – is our main concern 
here. In essence the symbolism of parliamentary architecture provides cues to audiences 
constituted of state citizens. In this sense, parliamentary architectures serve as powerful 
symbols as to what parliaments are and what their occupants claim to do in relation to citizens 
and state. Indeed, the design of parliamentary buildings provides architectural cues as to their 
political importance. Typically, parliaments are designed with what Parkinson (2012:95) calls 
‘symbolic intent’. Significantly this symbolic intent varies across time, space and cultures. 
 
The UK parliament traces its architectural heritage back to the 11th century, with Westminster 
Hall – built under William II and conceived as ‘a project to impress his new subjects with his 
power and the majesty of his authority’ (UK Parliament 2015a) – still standing today. 
Westminster Hall was initially part of the King’s palace and the UK parliamentary buildings are 
still known as Westminster Palace. Ultimately, these buildings came to serve as symbolic 
representations of the constitutional distinction between Lords and Commons in physically 
separate, but proximate, chambers unified under the architectural canopy of a royal palace. 
The symbolism of parliament’s medieval architectural origins withstood later remodelling of 
the Palace of Westminster until the destruction of both chambers and other parliamentary 
buildings in the fire of 1834. 
 
The rebuilt palace integrated the surviving medieval buildings into the new design. The choice 
of the Gothic style – prescribed by a Royal Commission and realised by Barry and Pugin – 
was, at one level, a practical design solution as it allowed for the incorporation of surviving 
medieval structures. At another level however, perpendicular gothic ‘was viewed by the mid-
nineteenth-century Englishman as inherently … English … and because of the long 
association of Parliament with the medieval palace of Westminster the Gothic style was 
viewed as being connected with the parliamentary form of government’ (Roth and Roth Clark 
2014:510). When completed and ‘towering over the modest brick-built Georgian terraces of 
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Westminster, the new Palace had an enormous effect on the imagination of the Victorian 
public’ (UK Parliament 2015b). But exactly what effect was intended is open to dispute (see 
Rorabaugh 1973 and below). 
 
The later decision to maintain the basic shape, dimensions and Gothic form of the Commons 
chamber when it was rebuilt, after its destruction by bombing in 1941, was famously supported 
by Churchill in the Commons in his oft-quoted statement that: ‘we shape our buildings and 
afterwards our buildings shape us’ (HC Debates, 28 October 1943:col.403; see also 
Nicholson, HC Debates, 28 October 1943:col.437). 
 
The Scottish Parliament, built at the turn of the 21st century at Holyrood in Edinburgh, was 
designed with clear symbolic intent. The architects, led by Miralles, made clear in their design 
portfolio the political implications inherent within their design: ‘The crucial idea that sustains it 
is that: the Parliament is the land because it belongs to the Scottish land. This is our goal … 
we don’t want to forget that the Scottish Parliament will be in Edinburgh, but will belong to 
Scotland, to the Scottish land’ (EMBT 1998). Indeed, Scottish sociologist David McCrone 
captured the symbolic power of the new parliamentary building in his statement: 
 
[b]uildings are not inert, not simply the outcomes of decisions; they have the power to 
signify and move to political action. … Miralles used his [design] motif in a highly symbolic 
way, to evoke fluidity and movement, of parliament running into the land, into Scot-Land. 
… This is not an administrative office block, but the democratic crucible in which Scotland’s 
future will ultimately be decided, and on a map as yet unwritten. (McCrone 2005:24-5) 
 
But without prior knowledge of Miralles’ design concept – applicable to the bulk of the Scottish 
populace – the symbolism of the Holyrood parliament prompted divergent and often 
counterintuitive interpretation (see below).  
 
The European parliament with its modernist buildings in two cities, Brussels and Strasbourg, 
and its historical roots and administrative residues in a third city, Luxembourg, provides no 
exception to the use of architecture for symbolic purposes. In contradistinction to the other two 
parliaments, however, the EP does not represent the unifying core of a state, nation or nation-
state. Instead, the geographical dispersion of parliamentary buildings is portrayed as a 
representation of EU governance itself. In McNamara’s (2015a:105) words: ‘The buildings, the 
siting of those buildings and the process of locating the physical governance of the EU all work 
symbolically’. Thus, the notion of a dual-seat parliament in Brussels and Strasbourg could be 
interpreted as ‘a striking example of “localizing” the EU in national settings, moving outside 
the Brussels bubble and physically into member states’ (McNamara 2015b:76). Yet, equally 
the dual-seat symbolism was open to more sceptical interpretation by the parliamentary 
occupants of the buildings and external critics alike (see below). 
 
Moreover, the symbolism of the EU’s institutions, captured in their spatial dispersion and 
architectural design, has evolved and mutated overtime: from an initial stealth design to 
minimise the appearance of concentration of power (McNamara 2015a:106) whereby Brussels 
became the informal EU capital; through to more ambitious design strategies from the late-
1980s onwards and the emergence of a new EU institutional complex in Brussels, which 
symbolised the integrationist intent and upward power-flows codified in a succession of EU 
treaties. In tandem, the Weiss hemicycle, built in Strasbourg in the late-1990s, was envisaged 
by its architects as an expression of the culture of Europe and its history: ‘The architecture of 
the European Parliament … is also representative of … the democratic institution behind the 
building: … It is a contextual building in the broad sense of the word. It embodies the strength 
of unity and the openness of democracy’ (Architecture Studio 2015). 
 
Interpreting architectural symbols 
 
Symbolic representation, as noted above, is not merely the preserve of the referent and the 
making of symbols, it is equally concerned with the interpretation of symbols by makers and 
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by audiences. Parkinson (2012:97) notes for example that ‘the fact that a building was 
constructed for a given symbolic purpose, tells us relatively little about how it is actually seen 
and used … [c]ontext is what determines how a symbol is received’.  
 
Indeed, the rebuilding of the Westminster parliament after 1834 illustrates this point vividly for, 
as Cannadine (2000:19) argues, Barry and Pugin’s intentions, in tracing the medieval 
associations of the British representative institution, may have been ‘profoundly conservative, 
hierarchical and anti-democratic’. Certainly, their design consciously provided an architectural 
counterpoint to that of revolutionary France. Yet it should also be remembered that: ‘Any 
cueing effects of the new Houses of Parliament were weak at best [and] the buildings took on 
more democratic overtones as more democracy was enacted within them’ (Parkinson 
2012:98). In this regard interpretation of the Westminster Palace’s symbolism changed rapidly 
in the 19th century and came to signify something quite different to the original intent of its 
designers (Cannadine 2004:13). This was the symbolic intent invoked by Churchill in the 1943 
debate noted above. At the time, there was, as Shenton observes (2016:4 emphasis in 
original), a strong conviction among MPs that ‘the nineteenth-century House of Parliament 
was the ultimate architectural manifestation of representative democracy’. The 
representational cues – offered by the Gothic architectural embodiment of what Churchill 
described as the ‘most powerful assembly in the whole world’ (HC Debates 28 October 1943: 
col.408) – were profoundly positive. 
 
Some 70 years later, however, the crumbling edifice and outmoded interior of Westminster, 
and a potential refurbishment fee of some £5.7bn (Deloitte 2014), provided profoundly 
negative cues to MPs and a less deferential and more cynical public audience. In this context, 
calls for a new 21st century parliament building designed to symbolise new ways of doing 
politics became ever more strident and persistent. Many MPs were quick to point out how the 
initial symbolic intent of the Barry/Pugin design had transmogrified to the extent that the Palace 
of Westminster now reflected ‘in many ways a by-gone era and require[s] fundamental change 
to properly serve a modern democracy’ (Roger Mullin MP 2016). Labour MP Chuka Umunna 
(2016) was convinced that: ‘We cannot continue this way of doing politics in a 21st century 
world …. Let us get out of the Palace of Westminster, which … should be changed into a 
museum, and let Parliament function in a modern building, in a modern way’. Indeed, the 
degree of conceptual travel from the original mid-19th century symbolic intent of Westminster 
to the interpretation of that intent two centuries later bears testament to Therborn’s (2014:335) 
observation that there are multiple ways of seeing and reading any given symbol. 
 
Similarly, the symbolic intent of the Scottish parliament’s design has been open to contrasting 
interpretations in its relatively short life. On the positive side, the chamber and public spaces 
of Miralles’ interior design have impressed, even if many visitors remain unsure about his 
vision. The symbolism of the building has been interpreted officially by parliamentary tour 
guides, and in 22 webpages of the parliamentary website explaining the meaning of 
Holyrood’s architecture and detailing the project history of the building. On the negative side, 
the symbolic intent of the Scottish parliament has remained ambiguous. Despite the building 
winning numerous architectural awards, its political signposts have been interpreted 
negatively by sections of expert and lay publics alike. Thus, for example, Spring noted (2010): 
‘If any building really does need to have an iconic form, it is a national legislature. … this just 
doesn’t exist [at Holyrood]’. He went on to quote one MSP’s belief that, ‘You don’t walk past 
this building saying, “That’s a big impressive building, that’s a parliament.” You walk past 
saying, “Why?”’. Indeed, the public remained largely clueless (and often antipathetic) as to the 
building’s symbolic prompts, with a survey in 2005 recording that the Scottish parliament 
headed the list of Britain’s ‘most vile buildings’ (The Observer, 7 August 2005). Moreover, for 
significant sections of the Scottish media, and for devolution sceptics, the intricacies of the 
architectural design, subsequent problems with construction and cost-overrun, simply served 
as a metaphor for the inherent deficiencies of the institutional design of devolution (Mitchell 
2004:35; Author 2005:183).  
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In the case of the EP, whereas the architects sought to symbolise the transition of centralised 
state power to the openness of European democracy, their work has been interpreted 
differently when refracted through eurosceptic ideational lenses. This interpretation is vividly 
reflected in Daniel Hannan’s (Conservative MEP) statement: 
 
The European Parliament’s gargantuan edifices are the perfect symbols of the larger [EU] 
…The European Parliament, in short, is the European Union’s objective correlative: the 
thing that expresses, in physical form, the project’s abstract flaws. Prodigal, labyrinthine, 
constantly expanding, and wanting any sense of proportion, it is the perfect symbol of the 
whole Euro-racket. (Hannan 2015)  
 
Less sceptical MEPs, for example members of the cross-party and pro-European Single Seat 
campaign group, were equally aware of the negative symbolism – invoked by the financial, 
environmental and political costs – associated with a dual-seat parliament. 
 
‘Terms and Understandings’: Institutional Representative Claims and Claim-Makers  
While symbolic representation is of importance for the representation of parliaments as 
institutions, the preceding discussion has highlighted how the cueing effect of architectural 
symbols is not intrinsic but is interpreted. In this specific process of interpretation, and in 
processes of institutional representation more generally, the making of claims – of providing 
institutional meaning – are of vital significance. We now turn attention, therefore, to who act 
as institutional claim-makers, the nature of the claims made, the intended audiences to which 
claims are addressed, and how institutional representation varies in our three case studies 
according to their respective contexts. 
 
Who makes institutional claims? 
 
i) Elected Representatives: Crosscutting representative claims 
It is relatively easy to identify who are not the primary actors in making institutional claims. 
Paradoxically, elected representatives, who are the prime makers of electoral representative 
claims, are at best tangential makers of institutional representative claims. Whereas elected 
representatives can legitimately claim to act for, speak for, or stand for, their construction of 
their constituencies within the frame of electoral politics, this is a first-dimensional set of 
claims. The representative, whether as an individual or part of a collectivity of individuals (most 
notably party, government, or parliamentarians), makes a claim to represent the represented, 
whether as individuals or collectivities of individuals (most notably as members of 
geographical constituencies, political parties, or nations and/or states). This is a two-way 
process as representatives may also serve to represent the constructed claims of the 
collectivities (especially of party, government or state) back to the represented (see Mair 
2009:6). In this process elected representatives may be identified as the makers of claims 
about their parties or about governments (supportive or otherwise) or about the nation and/or 
state, but only tangentially about parliament as an institution. Whereas the other collective 
forms have some existence beyond parliament; parliament itself, as a collectivity, does not 
have an institutional representational existence other than as the sum of disparate other ‘first-
dimension’ forms of representation.  
 
In the case of the UK parliament, Kelso (2007:371-2) pointed to this phenomenon in her 
observation that: ‘The public regularly view politicians as party members, as government 
members and as constituency MPs, but rarely as parliamentarians … Parliament struggles 
with its identity as a holistic institution’ (see also Author 2014:422). Likewise, MPs construct 
different representations of themselves in relation to different audiences, whether these be in 
relation to geographical constituencies, political parties, government (support for or critic of), 
nation or state. These constructions are normally portrayed as ‘roles’, as patterns of 
understanding and behaviour held by MPs, and cursory examination of UK MPs’ websites 
confirms that these roles do not privilege the institutional role of parliamentarian. Individually, 
elected representatives rarely act as claim-makers on behalf of the institutional collectivity of 
the Westminster parliament. Indeed, MPs often gain political advantage by making anti-
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institutional claims; either as members of new type or protest parties, as party mavericks or 
as part of their electoral strategy. Thus, for example, as an anti-UK-system party, the Scottish 
National Party (SNP), secures political advantage in the UK Parliament from claiming that 
Westminster is a ‘totally defunct institution’ (Mhari Black, SNP MP, The Guardian, 17 March 
2016). Party mavericks, such as former Conservative Zac Goldsmith, seek to enhance their 
populist credibility through interpreting Westminster as an institution insulated from the 
electorate (HC Debates 21 October 2014 vol. 586:col.791). Even Nick Clegg (2013), as 
Deputy Prime Minister, saw electoral advantage in criticising the ‘Westminster bubble’. 
Similarly, Andy Burnham during his campaign to become Leader of the Labour party in 2015 
saw partisan advantage in repeatedly decrying the Westminster bubble (Cowley 2015). 
 
In this sense the Westminster parliament takes on a ‘hollowed-out’ representative institutional 
form: it is populated by active person-to-person claim-makers but those same claim-makers 
do not primarily stand for, or make positive claims on behalf of, the institution itself. Institutional 
claim-making has become largely the preserve of those insulated from the demands of 
person-to-person representation – either through the adoption by elected representatives of 
designated collective institutional roles (such as the Speaker of the House of Commons in 
Westminster, the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament or the President of the European 
Parliament) or by non-elected parliamentary officials. 
 
In Scotland, while the aspirations of the Scottish parliament’s political designers matched 
those of its architectural designers – for a more transparent, participatory, inclusive and easily 
accessible institution that brought together the Scottish nation under one roof, rooted in a new 
and consensual politics – these ambitions were, in Mitchell’s words (2010:107), ‘given little or 
no substantive institutional form’. Such a basic consensus of what the parliament was 
(representation as standing for) and what it was intended to do (representation as activity) 
was largely illusory. On both counts its own members found it difficult to construct consensual 
claims on its behalf. There was a fundamental partisan divide about how the Scottish 
parliament should be conceived (Mitchell 2014:156-86; Johns and Mitchell 2016:158-80). The 
significance of this partisan divide, which reflected a more deep-seated neo-unionist/neo-
nationalist divide (Keating 2009:130), was that it made it difficult for MSPs to make claims for 
the Scottish parliament in its own right rather than as a proxy for a different institutional order 
– of, respectively, a union UK state or an independent Scottish state. These difficulties were 
compounded by the fact that the consensual aspirations of new politics were rapidly 
reconfigured into adversarial political realities, and bifurcation associated with executive 
dominance (Cairney 2015:219-20). Thus, the very characteristics that constrained the 
capacity of MPs in Westminster to act as claim-makers for the institution of parliament, qua 
parliament, were replicated in Holyrood. This point was acknowledged by one Holyrood official 
who noted in interview, ‘when you’re working in an organisation, … usually organisations do 
speak with one voice largely. When you work in a Parliament you don’t speak with one voice. 
We’ve got 129 [elected] Members, but they’re very capable of having opposing and critical 
views of what the institution does’ (Interview 26).  
 
Whereas the case can be made that, paradoxically, elected representatives in the UK and 
Scottish parliaments – the prime makers of electoral representative claims – are at best 
makers of tangential institutional representative claims, a stark qualification to any general 
observations to be derived from these cases is provided by the EP. The EP is often treated 
as a sui generis institution operating in a broader sui generis EU institutional matrix. The exact 
nature of this matrix is not the prime concern here. What is of interest here, however, is how 
the EP became a parliament, how the representation of that institution developed over time 
and who acted as the prime institutional claim-makers. In the first instance, the EP was not 
established as a parliament in the received sense of the term. It was conceived, by Monnet, 
as a ‘rudimentary assembly’ or at best a ‘parliamentary control organ’ (Monnet in Rittberger 
2005:28). Democratic participation through an elected representative institution was, 
therefore, something for the future.  
 
 9 
The promotion of that parliamentary future was inextricably associated with institutional claim-
makers who created an image, a representation, of what the EP was and where it should be 
situated in relation to other institutions. Members of the Assembly effectively identified 
themselves as part of a collective institution defined in terms of its distinctiveness from other 
EU institutions and national representative institutions. That distinctiveness, often portrayed 
as an embattled institutional status, was an essential feature of the representational claims 
made on behalf of the Common Assembly and of its institutional successors (Corbett 1998; 
Priestley 2008:ix-xxii; Corbett et al. 2011:382-97). 
 
In other words, the EP’s organisational form and structural location mitigated the cross-cutting 
segmentation of institutional claims apparent in other parliaments. First, in the absence of 
overlapping legislative and executive leadership positions in the EP. Second, in the majority 
voting requirements and the nature of coalition formation amongst political groups in the EP, 
which serve to signal ideological competition while still presenting a united institutional front in 
the EP’s interactions with other institutions. Third, in institutional organisational structures, 
reflected in the composition and role of the Bureau with its responsibility for administrative and 
managerial matters in the EP. Whereas the House of Commons’ Commission and the Scottish 
Parliament’s Corporate Body act essentially in a rubber-stamp capacity, with MPs by-and-
large deferring to the decisions made by parliamentary management services, MEPs in the 
EP’s Bureau take an active role in developing their vision for the institution as part of their 
policy portfolios (Interview 6; Interview 7; Interview 16; Interview 21; Interview 27; Interview 
29). One interviewee made this clear by identifying the importance of Bureau members, and 
MEPs more generally, in representing the institution of Parliament per se (Interview 6). This 
amplifies the broader point that MEPs have historically acted as institutional claim-makers, 
representing the EP as both vision and embodiment of a democratic Europe (European 
Parliament 2009; Priestley 2008:23-44). Admittedly, the more ideologically polarised and 
fragmented composition of the EP, particularly since 2014, with increased representation of 
Eurosceptic and nationalist parties, found reflection in increased anti-institutional, anti-
integrationist and anti-parliamentary claims made internally with the EP. 
 
ii) Parliamentary Officials: proactive institutional claim-makers 
In recent times of systemic dislocation, when the ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of established 
parliamentary institutions has become subject to reappraisal and hence to contestation – in 
the form of non-traditional, non-electoral representational practices, and in conceptual 
rethinking of representation – then the requirement for institutional representation, for claims 
to be made about and on behalf of parliaments themselves, has been thrown into stark relief. 
In these circumstances, or where newly created parliaments seek to assert their democratic 
credentials, public engagement strategies have come to be elevated in the corporate priorities 
of many parliaments. These are not simply educational or informational strategies. They are, 
more significantly, representational strategies. As Author (2016:13) notes: ‘behind the 
planning of public engagement, there is an explicit effort therefore in developing amongst the 
public an appreciation of the institution as part of the fabric of their lives’. This task of 
appreciation building, as noted above, has largely accrued to non-partisan institutional claim-
makers (such as the Speaker of the House of Commons) or by parliamentary officials and 
services.  
 
The narrative of such claim-makers is consciously institutional. In the words of one UK 
parliamentary official: ‘It’s not our job to disseminate the work of Members, … it would be 
inappropriate for us to do so. We’re here to promote awareness of the institution and the 
processes of the institution’ (Interview 13). This view was reiterated by several other 
interviewees: ‘Parliaments in my view are not the property of parliamentarians, they are not 
the preserve of politicians, they belong to the people out there and we must never forget that 
in what we do in terms of our outreach and the way we make information available’ (Interview 
56) and ‘we don’t take the place of that relationship that Members have with their constituents, 
but we rather work in a different space’ (Interview 11). 
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In Westminster, indeed, the defence of the institution seems primarily to reside in the hands 
of officials, particularly since the 2009 MPs expenses crisis. Post-2009, MPs retreated even 
further from their already minimalist levels of claim-making on behalf of the institution of 
parliament. This institutional representative void contributed to the systematic expansion of 
the UK’s Parliament’s outreach and educational services (Author 2016), with the explicit 
objective of spreading ‘awareness of the work, processes and relevance of the institution of 
parliament’ (HC 697 2012: Ev w62). As one of our interviewees confirmed: ‘the expenses issue 
highlighted the fact that Parliament needed to engage much more with the public and explain 
itself much more to the public’ (Interview 43). Indeed, the Hansard Society recognised that 
such outreach work added ‘an extra dimension to [the] strategy of promoting Parliament as a 
unified institution’ (Hansard Society 2006:5).  
 
Similarly, in the Scottish parliament, officials readily make claims on behalf of the institution. 
In interview officials clearly saw themselves as the defenders of the institutional image of an 
open, consensual and transparent institution, and one that serves as the symbolic 
representation of the nation of Scotland. Officials were very conscious of being the key 
ambassadors of the institution: ‘the engagement work that we do … is about trying to create 
a positive image for the parliament and to position it in Scottish people’s minds as an institution 
that is actually here and it’s working for you and all the rest of it. We’re very conscious that we 
are ambassadors for the parliament in that respect’ (Interview 33).  
 
MEPs, as noted above, historically have been more active institutional claim-makers than 
Westminster MPs or MSPs. In this task they were aided ‘by a generation of officials who 
dedicated their professional lives to assisting MEPs to reinforce the institution’s role’ and who 
undoubtedly assisted ‘in the remarkable rise in influence of the parliament’ (Corbett et al. 
2011:230; see also Author 2008:166). These activist officials were to be found pre-eminently 
in the EP’s legal services and the most prestigious committees, but institutional reinforcement 
was also provided by what is now the Directorate-General for Communication. As Laursen 
and Valenti observe, the EP’s press officers ‘see themselves as the EP’s institutional voice’ 
and are ‘very aware that they are in the business of strategic communication, and that their 
objectives include increasing the EP’s visibility in the media and shaping the EP’s image’ 
(2014:34-35, emphasis added), a view confirmed by several of our interviewees (Interview 9; 
Interview 2; Interview 5). One of Laursen and Valenti’s interviewees went so far as to 
acknowledge that their aim was ‘to sell’ the institution. Likewise, one of our interviewees spoke 
specifically about ‘selling’ the EP as an institution (Interview 1). Another of our interviewees 
noted the distinction between the ‘institutional representative’ claims made by officials and the 
‘electoral representative’ claims made by MEPs and EP party groups: 
 
one of our roles must be taking care of the European Parliament’s reputation and this 
is something which cannot be done, which shouldn’t be done by the political actors, by 
the political groups, by the Members themselves. They have their own agendas, they 
have their own purposes and their own strategies, they are not there for protecting the 
European Parliament or for projecting the European Parliament, but their political 
opinions and their political work. This is not an institution which has two or three 
hundred years of history so it means that it is not always well known and it is not always 
well understood. And this is probably one of the important roles of an institutional press 
service and an institutional communications service. (Interview 7) 
 
In this shaping and selling of the EP, officials are engaged in claim-making – in providing 
institutional meaning.  
 
Nature of institutional claims 
 
We now turn to what constitute institutional claims. In essence the institutional claims made 
about parliaments are first-order legitimation claims. In an era when the electoral claims of 
parliamentary representatives are counterposed by non-electoral representative claims and 
undermined by citizens’ distrust, the legitimacy of electoral processes and institutions – and 
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the wider democratic systems within which they are nested – come under sustained challenge 
(Dalton 2004; Norris 2011). In these circumstances the default recourse, to claims of diffuse 
support and of the virtues of ‘taken-for-grantedness’ of parliamentary institutions, become less 
convincing and defending the virtues of electoral representative institutions becomes 
particularly pressing for institutional claim-makers.  
 
This was clearly articulated by several interviewees at Westminster: ‘[our aim is to show that] 
Parliament is a worthwhile institution, it’s something that should be valued and is relevant to 
people’s lives … we want people to realise that Parliament is the heart of our democracy’ 
(Interview 11); and ‘the whole goal … is to present the House of Commons as the central 
institution in our democracy’ (Interview 18). This latter senior official went on to observe that: 
 
unless someone stood up for Parliament as an entity we might lose it. It wouldn’t be seen 
as precious. … now we have quite a clear appreciation that the image of Parliament is 
very important. [And] implicit in that is an acceptance that the House has a personality, the 
House has a reputation that needs to be protected and built up. So looking at how well 
respected the institution is, is now the number one thing on the list of what we are seeking 
to do. (Interview 18) 
 
In Scotland, parliamentary officials identified their key tasks to include not only the promotion 
of the Scottish Parliament as an institution, but also a broader role in promoting its links with 
civil society and its integration into the fabric of Scottish society and politics. In the first instance 
they emphasised the representation of the collective institution above the segmented 
organisational interests of its constituent elements. Thus one official noted: ‘You can’t consider 
an individual committee above the parliament’s image or an individual convenor above the 
parliament’s image. It’s always got to be about the parliament … We’ve got to put parliament 
first and not the convenors or individual members unless it’s the Presiding Officer who is 
obviously part of parliament’s overall image’ (Interview 32). In the second instance, as one 
senior official observed, a broader representative claim is rooted in the fact that the Scottish 
parliament ‘very much sees itself as playing a role in the cultural life of the country. So we like 
to promote Scotland and promote the best of Scotland in terms of what we do in the Scottish 
parliament’ (Interview 26).  
 
The representational move identified by Scottish parliamentary officials, of locating the 
institution of parliament within a broader conception of a civic-nationalist democratic frame, 
was echoed and amplified by EP officials who identified their task not simply as articulating 
the democratic credentials and the electoral legitimacy of the EP, but also rooting the EP within 
the integrationist EU project of an ever closer union. Indeed, the interviewed EP officials 
identified themselves not simply as institutional claim-makers for the EP, but also as claim-
makers for the EU. The representation of the EP as an institution was inextricably linked to 
the representation of a legitimate European polity. As one official stated, the image of the EP 
should be encapsulated in the word ‘democracy’: ‘For me it should be a democracy in Europe. 
… Europe is the project you can offer your kids and it’s even more than this, that’s the only 
project you can offer your kids … Europe is great. I mean Europe gives you the possibility to 
travel, to settle. … And yes, the European Parliament is a parliament and it’s a democracy in 
Europe’ (Interview 1). Indeed, another senior official stressed the inextricable linkage of the 
institutional standing of the EP, and its legitimation claims, to the broader EU integrationist 
project:  
 
At the European level this is much more difficult than at the national one, because at the 
national one probably people do not ask themselves about the sense of an institution or 
the necessity of having this institution. This is something which is there, so no questions 
about it. In our case we belong to something which is always discussed which is the 
European Union and which is what we call the European construction, so it means that 
we are weaker from this point of view and that we should also be more active than other 
institutions in explaining our work. So of course the Parliament has the full legitimacy 
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which comes from the fact that the Members are elected in general, open elections, but 
in some way and at the same time we have to look for this legitimacy. (Interview 7) 
 
Audience(s) for institutional claims 
 
Our focus so far has been upon institutional representation, conceived in terms of symbolic 
representation and claim-making processes. Yet, it should be noted that Saward’s notion of 
the representative claim incorporates audiences as an essential part of his analysis. As he 
states: ‘representative claims can only work, or even exist, if audiences acknowledge them in 
some way, and are able to absorb, reject, or accept them, or otherwise engage with them’ 
(Saward 2010:48). Saward’s articulation of the types of audiences and their connections to 
types of constituencies is complex and beyond the immediate scope of our discussion. 
Nonetheless, his distinction between intended audiences and actual audiences enables us to 
foreground our discussion upon the former rather than the latter. An intended audience, for 
Saward (2010:50) is ‘the group to which a claim is addressed’ and is ‘maker-driven’; an actual 
audience is ‘the group whose members are conscious of receiving … the claim’ and is 
‘recipient-driven’. At this stage in our research, data on the reception of institutional claims is 
unavailable. Our interviews did provide, however, some indication of how institutional claim-
makers conceived of their intended audiences and how they sought to identify variegated 
audiences.  
 
Manifestly ‘the general public’ is the key audience for the institutional claim-makers in our 
sample, with all of our interviewees referring in general terms to ‘the people’ or ‘the public’. In 
each parliament, however, officials recognised more specific target audiences: primarily young 
people and the disengaged. Thus, one official from the Scottish Parliament, in explaining the 
importance of the parliament’s educational programmes, observed ‘our key priorities are really 
getting [at] mainly young people and some adults, [to] let them learn about the Scottish 
Parliament’ (Interview 33). Similarly, an official in Westminster – in explaining the main aim of 
the new engagement services – acknowledged that it was primarily a response to ‘realising 
that there was a public that was not getting engaged simply by what individual representatives 
were doing’ (Interview 18). This aim is explicitly articulated in the official description of the 
responsibilities of the Commons’ Outreach and Engagement Group: ‘[to] engag[e] with people 
who Parliament has not yet reached and adding value to the business of Parliament by 
diversifying the range of people who engage and participate’ (UK Parliament 2016). For our 
interviewees in the EP, the non-voting public constituted a particularly important audience. All 
EP interviewees justified their engagement activity as ultimately aimed at raising turnout. As 
one engagement official observed: ‘Of course I’m not the one campaigning. But whatever we 
can do to show what the Parliament’s doing … I hope will at the end have an impact on the 
turnout. … at the back of my mind that’s what we should all keep in mind. Get a big turnout’ 
(Interview 1).  
 
Another intended audience is the media, with the development of press offices and media 
relations units in all three parliaments acknowledging the importance of these audiences, 
which can help both to disseminate and appraise – not necessarily favourably – institutional 
claims. The significance of these media audiences was recognised in turn by our interviewees 
(Interview 9; Interview 33; Interview 43). Increasingly, civic society and advocacy groups – 
which Saward (2010:186) identifies as ‘effective audiences’ with the resources and social 
capital to act as opinion-shapers with respect to claims – have also been targeted by 
institutional claim-makers. The identification of community groups as specific audiences is 
particularly clear in programmes developed by the Scottish and the UK Parliaments. Thus one 
Scottish parliament official drew attention to ‘our community partnerships project and that’s 
really about working with groups over a 12-month period’ (Interview 33), while a Westminster 
official noted a strategy of ‘work[ing] with organisations who want to campaign’ (Interview 13). 
 
Conclusion 
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Institutional representation has been a neglected dimension of both recent re-
conceptualisations of representation and of empirical studies of parliamentary representation. 
As a first step in remedying this neglect, we have argued that key notions in the re-
conceptualisation of political representation – symbolic representation and representation as 
claim-making – provide clues as to how parliaments, as institutions, are portrayed or 
interpreted. As a second step, we examined the practice of institutional representation in 
relation to the Scottish, UK and European parliaments. This practice varies in accordance with 
the extent to which the status of parliaments in our sample, as ‘ready-made’ or ‘taken-for-
granted’ institutions, is either under construction or under challenge. Institutional 
representation and institutional claim-making is of significance when assumptions about the 
institutional legitimacy of established parliaments are challenged (as in the case of the UK 
parliament), or are in the process of being made (as in the case of the Scottish parliament) or 
exist in putative form in a perceived sui generis system (as in the case of the EP). In these 
circumstances the institutional claims made about, and on behalf of, parliaments are first-order 
legitimation claims. 
 
If, as we argue, institutional representation has assumed greater importance – as citizens’ 
distrust and disengagement from parliaments appear to have increased – then it is necessary 
to understand who makes representative claims on behalf of parliamentary institutions. 
Paradoxically, elected representatives, who are the prime makers of electoral representative 
claims, are at best tangential makers of institutional representative claims in two of our sample 
parliaments – the Scottish and UK parliaments. In the case of the EP, however, its 
organisational form and structural location in the EU’s polity has served to mitigate the cross-
cutting segmentation of institutional claims associated with partisan and executive hierarchies 
in the other parliaments. 
 
In all three parliaments public engagement strategies are an integral part of their corporate 
priorities. Yet, these are not simply educational or informational strategies; they are, more 
significantly, representational strategies. These strategies have largely depended for their 
implementation upon non-partisan institutional claim-makers or parliamentary officials. The 
ultimate paradox of ‘institutional representation’, therefore, is that the people who ‘speak for’ 
(most loudly and most persistently) and ‘act for’ parliaments as institutions are not primarily 
elected representatives but rather non-elected officials. In an epoch when elected 
representatives are cowed by populist claim-makers – demagogues, challenger parties and 
protest social movements – and confronted routinely by claims that are intrinsically anti-
parliamentary and anti-elitist (in a specific sense of the questioning of elected representatives 
and political establishments), this paradox of the institutional representation of parliaments 
raises questions that should not only be of concern for representative theory but, more 
fundamentally, should also be of concern for representative democracy itself. 
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Appendix 1 
 
List of Key Parliamentary Interviewees (out of the total of 39)  
 
Interview 1 (2010) Official, European Parliament. 
Interview 2 (2010) Official, European Parliament. 
Interview 5 (2010) Official, European Parliament. 
Interview 6 (2010) MEP, European Parliament. 
Interview 7 (2011) Official, European Parliament. 
Interview 9 (2011) Official, European Parliament. 
Interview 11 (2010) Official, UK Parliament. 
Interview 13 (2010) Official, UK Parliament. 
Interview 16 (2010) MP, UK Parliament. 
Interview 18 (2010) Official, UK Parliament. 
Interview 21 (2011) MP, UK Parliament. 
Interview 26 (2010) Official, Scottish Parliament. 
Interview 27 (2010) MSP, Scottish Parliament. 
Interview 29 (2010) MSP, Scottish Parliament. 
Interview 32 (2011) Official, Scottish Parliament. 
Interview 33 (2011) Official, Scottish Parliament. 
Interview 43 (2011) Official, UK Parliament. 
Interview 56 (2013) Official, UK Parliament. 
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Notes 
1
 This ‘first dimensional’ model assumes an unmediated simple principal-agent relationship between 
elected representatives and individual citizens, which depends, paradoxically, upon this relationship 
being mediated through ‘constituencies’ designed to organise individual voters into collectivities; 
incorporates notions of political equality into electoral representation through the universal franchise, 
and holds that legitimacy flows from a set of procedural standards of authorisation and accountability 
associated with free and fair elections to representative institutions (for summaries of this model see 
Urbinati and Warren 2008:389; Hayward 2009:111; Alonso et al. 2011:2-6; Author 2014:1-4; Disch 
2015:489). 
2
 The significance of Saward’s ideas for parliamentary scholars has been recognised, for example, by 
Author (2014); Author (2016), Crewe (2015); shortcomings of notions of representative claims, of 
relevance to students of legislatures, have been noted by Author (2013; 2014), Childs and Lovenduski 
(2013); Lord and Pollak (2013). 
3
 Our focus here is exclusively on parliamentary architecture, for wider discussions of the importance 
of symbolic representation in legislatures see, for example, Author (2016); Crewe (2015); Rai 2010; 
Rai and Johnson (2014).  
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